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SYMPOSIUM ON ABORIGINAL LAND RIGHTS 
In 1988 Australia celebrated two hundred years of European settlement. 
At its annual conference the Australian Division of the Australasian 
Association of Philosophy marked the occasion with a symposium on claims 
by Aboriginal p_eople for compensation arising out of that settlement. The 
two papers below were presented at the symposium and were subsequently 
accepted for publication by the previous Editor. Though they are appearing 
well after the bicentennial events, the issues they address remain topical 
both in Australia, in New Zealand which in 1990 is celebrating its founding 
one hundred and fifty years ago with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, 
and in other countries where European settlement impacted on indigenous 
peoples [Ed.]. 
I. LAND RIGHTS AND ABORIGINAL SOVEREIGNTY 
Janna Thompson 
When the First Fleet arrived at Sydney Cove in 1788 the officials planted 
the British flag on Australian soil and 'took possession', as they put it, of 
the colony of New South Wales. In taking possession they were declaring 
that the eastern part of Australia was under British sovereignty. As one 
legal scholar put it, 'The invisible and inescapable cargo of English law 
fell from their shoulders and attached itself to the soil on which they stood. '1 
The assumption ofsovereignty was carded out according to accepted practice. 
At that time, and on into our century, it has been customary for European 
powers to establish sovereignty over lands where political authority of a 
European kind does not exist. 
In taking possession the first settlers were also declaring that the land 
of New South Wales henceforth belonged to the Crown. This act of possession 
was not customary. In most of their other colonies Britain and other European 
powers were prepared to acknowledge that the native people were the owners 
of the land, and settlers were expected to negotiate with these owners before 
establishing settlement and to pay them some form of compensation for 
i As said by R.T. Latham in 1937. Quoted in Henry Reynolds, Law of the Land(Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1987), p. 1. 
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314 I. Land Rights and Aboriginal Sovereignty 
taking over their land. No such requirement was ever placed on the settlers 
in Australia and whatever land was left for the use of Aborigines was regarded 
as a gift rather than something to which they were entitled. 2 
It is understandable that those people who support the campaign for 
Aboriginal land rights are especially concerned with undoing and making 
compensation for what they regard as a gross injustice: the dispossession 
of Aborigines from the land that they owned. The debate about ownership 
raises some familiar and difficult legal and philosophical questions about 
the basis for rights of property, what these rights entail and what, if anything, 
is due to the descendants of those who have been wrongly dispossessed. 3 
What I will be concerned with, however, is not the question of ownership 
but the question of sovereignty: the question of whether the British were 
entitled to declare sovereignty over Australia and its inhabitants. The fact 
that they were following a practice accepted among European powers 
suggests that according to international law, as it existed, they were doing 
nothing wrong. But the moral question of whether they were justified in 
doing what they did remains to be answered. An enquiry into the moral 
justification for an action performed 200 years ago is by no means irrelevant 
to our present concerns. Some of the most serious disputes in the world 
concern questions of sovereignty: questions about what group of people has 
the right to use and control a particular territory and what that entitlement 
rests on. Though this paper focuses on the issue of Aboriginal and rights, 
what is said about sovereignty will have implications for other disputes. 
As far as the question of Aboriginal and rights is concerned, an enquiry 
into sovereignty and its justifications has a bearing on how we understand 
the present position of Aborigines and what we think they have a right 
to claim. I think it can be argued that the most important hing which the 
Aborigines lost on that fateful day in 1788 was not heir ownership of the 
land but their sovereignty over it. Whether they retained rights of ownership 
or not, native people in lands occupied by European settlers have invariably 
ended up living on the margins of white society, occupying land which no 
one else wants (and then only as long as no one else wants it). The treaties 
governments have made with them have been ignored or violated, 
compensation has either never been paid, or when it has, it has never 
2 Reynolds argues (op. cit.) that British assumption of ownership was based on false beliefs 
about Aborigines and the Australian continent: e.g. that the land was largely empty of 
people. These beliefs were soon discovered to be false, but by then a particular way of 
dealing with the Aborigines had become ingrained in the life of the colony and in the 
expectations of the settlers. Only recently has an Australian government shown any signs 
of officially recognising that Aborigines originally owned the land. 
3 Some of these problems are discussed by David Lyons in 'The New Indian Claims and 
Original Rights to Land' in Reading Nozick." Essays on 'Anarchy, State and Utopia', ed. Jeffrey 
Paul (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), pp. 355-379. In the Australian context 
some of the issues are discussed by Reynolds (op.cit.) and in Ken Baker, ed., The Land 
Rights Debate" Selected Documents (Melbourne, Institute of Public Affairs, Policy Issues, 
n. d.); C.D. Rowley, Recovery: The Politics of Aboriginal Reform (Melbourne: Penguin, 1986); 
Max Charlesworth, The Aboriginal Land Rights Movement (Richmond: Hodja, 1984). 
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Janna Thompson 315 
adequately made up for the loss of their land. The Indians of North America 
and the Maoris of New Zealand may be in a better legal position today 
than Australian Aborigines because of treaties and promises made to their 
ancestors by colonial governments. But the situation of the American Indians, 
the Maofis and the Aborigines is similar and their common problems eem 
to stem from the fact that the territories they once controlled were subjected 
to European control and colonisation. What then is sovereignty? And why 
has the loss of it been so fateful? 
Property and Sovereignty 
The concept of property and the fights associated with property have been 
much discussed by philosophers. 'Sovereignty' has not received nearly so 
much attention, and it is therefore necessary to say something briefly about 
what it is and what it is supposed to entail. There are a number of uses 
of the word, but as I shall understand it, 'sovereignty' is the exercise by 
a people--whether a clan, a tribe or a nation--of control over a particular 
territory through their political and social institutions. Having control over 
a territory means being able to establish the law of the land. And the law 
of the land determines in its turn the parameters of property ownership: 
i.e. what entitlements individuals and groups in a society have to use the 
land and its resources for their own purposes, and what rights and 
responsibilities ownership entails. 4Property ownership and sovereignty are 
different: The people of a nation may exercise sovereignty over their territory 
through their courts and political institutions even though a large part of 
the land is owned by foreigners and multi-national companies. A nation 
may assume sovereignty over a territory, as did the British in India, without 
dispossessing people from their land (though by making the law the British 
did change the conditions of ownership). 
What above all determines the nature of sovereignty are the rights 
associated with it. It is generally assumed that a people who exercise 
sovereignty over a territory have certain entitlements which outsiders ought 
to respect. These entitlements are defined by international law, bythat body 
of doctrine called Just War Theory and by what people commonly regard 
as the fights of nations. According to these doctrines and customary ways 
of thinking, violations of sovereignty are always difficult to justify. In 
particular, the aggressive invasion of the territory ofone people by the people 
of another is almost always regarded as wrong. Michael Walzer in his account 
of Just War Theory finds only two basic exceptions to this general rule. 
One country may be justified in attacking and invading another in order 
to prevent a gross violation of human fights, or it may launch a pre-emptive 
4 The relationship between property and sovereignty raises a number of questions which 
have sometimes been debated by philosophers: the question, for example, of whether 
individuals have natural entitlements o property which the laws of any society ought to 
recognise. My view is that there is no such natural right, but I do not argue for this here. 
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316 I. Land Rights and Aboriginal Sovereignty 
strike in the case where it is clear that the other is on the brink of making 
an aggressive attackP 
It is also generally assumed that people who exercise sovereignty have 
a right to determine the uses of the resources of their territory within the 
framework of the law that they have established. They can trade as they 
please with outsiders and make the agreements and alliances which suit 
them. Those who exercise sovereignty are also assumed to have the right 
to determine who can come and live in their territory and to insist that 
these people obey the law of the land. Virtually all sovereign powers impose 
restrictions on immigration and believe that they are within their rights to 
do so. 
The entitlements a sociated with sovereignty are similar to the entitlements 
we associate with owning property. Property rights include the right of owners 
not to suffer invasion, to be able to use their possessions as they see fit, 
to extend hospitality to whom they wish and exclude others. Nevertheless 
there are some important differences between the entitlements associated 
with property and those associated with sovereignty. Not only does exercising 
sovereignty mean having the ability to make the law which governs property- 
ownership, among other things, but in addition the rights within a territory 
which having sovereignty entails are inalienable. Property can be bought 
or sold according to the wills of those concerned. Children and descendants 
are not in general legally entitled to demand that the property of their parents 
be passed on to them. But it is generally regarded as illegitimate or impossible 
for a group of people or their government tosell or give away their sovereignty 
to another (though they may legitimately sell their rights over a colony 
or an uninhabited area; and others may illegitimately force them to give 
up their sovereignty.) This suggests that according to our understanding of
the rights of sovereignty, it is presumed that the descendants of those who 
exercise it do have an entitlement to have it passed on to them. Sovereignty 
is something held by a people in perpetuity. 
In taking over Australia, the British declared themselves the makers of 
the law of the land; they assumed for themselves the right to determine 
how the resources of Australia would be developed and used, and the right 
to determine who would be allowed to settle on the land. In so doing they 
ensured that the native inhabitants would become a beleagured people in 
the land that they formerly controlled. For even if the British had recognised 
Aboriginal ownership of land, the Aborigines, like native people in other 
lands, would have found themselves bargaining from a position of weakness. 
Subject to an alien law, having no control over settlers flooding into the 
country, they would have had little choice but to retreat in front of the 
onslaught, salvaging as much for themselves as possible, or resisting and 
facing the consequences. 
Why then should we not regard the British takeover of Australia, along 
with other colonial invasions, as an unjustified violation of the sovereignty 
5 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), Chapters 5, 6. 
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Janna Thompson 317 
of another people? Aboriginal societies had clearly established a law for 
their land, and thus would seem to be entitled to the rights associated with 
sovereignty. None of the reasons which Just War Theory offers as a ground 
for a justified invasion seems to apply in this case. The fact that the native 
inhabitants were not able effectively to resist this invasion does not help 
to justify it any more than a rape becomes justified if the victim is unable 
to fight back. 
Possibly the British would have argued that Aborigines did not have 
sovereignty over the territory they occupied and therefore did not have the 
rights associated with sovereignty. Those who argue in this way are giving 
'sovereignty' a much narrower meaning than I have given it. They are 
assuming that sovereignty, properly speaking, can only be exercised through 
the institutions of a state, and that those people who do not have a state 
do not exercise sovereignty over the territory they occupy. Indeed international 
law is mostly about he relations between states, and those who are concerned 
with Just War Theory, like Walzer, simply assume that they are talking 
about relations between states. But why should this assumption be made? 
Presumably the reason why a state is regarded by its citizens and the 
rest of the world as having the entitlements of sovereignty is because of 
the ability of its government and institutions to make and enforce the law 
in its territory, to protect he people who live under its rule, and preserve 
and maintain the values and way of life which are important to them. However 
if social and political institutions of other kinds can perform the same function, 
there seems no reason for denying that people with these institutions also 
exercise sovereignty through them. It should be added that the fact that 
Aboriginal Australia was not one political unit, but rather a collection of 
units, does not seem to constitute a reason for denying that Aboriginal 
communities exercised sovereignty anymore than the fact that Europe is 
not one political unit would constitute a reason for ignoring the entitlements 
of the people in its separate states. 
But because Aborigines did not have a state in the European sense their 
territory was bound to become an object for European exploitation. A 
justification that has often been given for British assumption of sovereignty 
is that if the British had not declared Australia to be theirs, some other 
European nation would have taken it over. However, if the occupation of 
Australia is to be regarded as something other than an exercise of Realpolitik 
(which simply declares moral considerations out of bounds) then some further 
justification has to be offered. Perhaps it could be argued that since Britain 
was the one which undertook the task of protecting Australia and its native 
inhabitants from being ravaged and exploited by pirates, entrepreneurs and 
European powers it deserved compensation for its trouble. Let us allow 
that this is so. But this argument does not justify the British takeover; it 
does not justify the loss of sovereignty which the Aborigines uffered. For 
it is not generally believed that sovereign people who have incurred a debt 
have to pay it through loss of their sovereignty to others. 
We are back, then, to the problem of justifying what seems, from 
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318 I. Land Rights and Aboriginal Sovereignty 
assumptions usually made about rights associated with sovereignty, to be 
unjustifiable: the takeover of Australia and of other territories by European 
powers. If a justification cannot be found, then we have to conclude that 
the invasion of Australia by British forces and settlers was as unjustified 
as any conquest by an aggressive power of its weaker neighbours. Such 
a conclusion will affect how we think about he events which the Bicentenary 
is supposed to commemorate and it may affect what we believe Aborigines 
are now entitled to. If, on the other hand, we are prepared to insist that 
the British invasion of Australia was legitimate then this will have implications 
for our views about sovereignty and the entitlements associated with it--  
implications which we may find unwelcome. The following can therefore 
be regarded as not simply a discussion of attempts to justify the colonisation 
of Australia but also as a critical examination of customary assumptions 
made about the fights associated with sovereignty. 
Justification of the Rights of Sovereignty 
What gives a people a title to the use and control of a territory? Franciscus 
de Victoria in the context of a discussion of Spanish activities in Central 
and South America in the 16th Century, says that people can be said to 
have dominion over a territory and have the entitlements associated with 
this dominion if they are in possession of it and control it through their 
political institutions and if they haven't obtained it by illegitimate means 
(e.g. by stealing it from others). 6 As a justification for sovereignty his formula 
is subject to an objection similar to the one which has often been raised 
against Locke's attempt to found the right of property on what an individual 
has taken for his own use: why should a group of people have the fight 
to possess a territory in perpetuity and keep everyone else from using it 
simply because they got there first? In his discussion of the reasons for 
the prohibition against aggression Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars provides 
the beginning of an answer to this question. 
Walzer finds the basis for the entitlement that people have over their 
territory in the 'common life they have made'. 'Over a long period of time, 
shared experiences and cooperative activity of many different kinds shape 
a common life. '7 Given that such a common life exists the people who share 
6 Franciscus de Victoria, De lndis Noviter lnventis (On the I dians Lately Discovered), trans. 
John Bate (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), 
Sec. I. Many of the arguments in my paper are a repetition f those which occur in this 
remarkable work which was written in 1532. It is obvious that he idea that sovereignty 
is only rightful if the land hasn't been taken from others i  problematic: the territories 
now in the possession f most existing states have been acquired originally by conquest 
or dispossession. A d it may be the case that mainland Aborigines dispossessed an earlier 
group of people. Two things can be said here: I) The fact hat sometime in their past 
a group of people took over land from others does not provide a justification for someone 
else taking over their land; 2) If land is in the possession fa group of people for a period 
of time, then they have rightful sovereignty. 
70p. cit., p. 54. See also Walzer's 'The Moral St nding of States: A Response to Four Critics' 
in Philosophy and Public Affairs, V. 9, n. 3 (1980), pp. 209-229. 
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Janna Thompson 319 
it have a fight to the territory they inhabit for the same reason that an 
individual has a right to space free from intruders. People who have a common 
life have to have somewhere to live it. 'It is for the sake of this common 
life that we assign a certain presumptive value to the boundaries that mark 
off a people's territory and to the state that defends it. '8 There is, of course, 
nothing in what he says which couldn't be applied to people who do not 
have institutions of state in the modern sense. 
But what's so important about being able to maintain a common life? 
If we take it, as most modern philosophy does, that it is individuals, their 
pleasures, pains, desires and values, which are the object of moral concern, 
then the answer to this question seems plain. A common life shapes the 
identity ofpersons. It determines or influences their values, their aspirations, 
their ideas about why they are and how they should relate to other people. 
To take away from a person his or her common life is therefore to take 
away something that he or she is likely to regard as enormously important. 
She may regard it as worse than taking away her life. The fact that individuals 
do regard their common life as something important and worth preserving 
is a good reason from a moral point of view for allowing them to do so. 
It is not, of course, a sufficient reason. A respect for people's desire to maintain 
their common life does not mean that forms of common life are beyond 
criticism, or that all of them are equally good, or that individuals might 
not be better off if they altered or gave up the common life which they 
presently have. It does not mean that interference in a people's way of life 
is never justified. If, for example, the common life of a group of people 
promotes hatred and aggression toward outsiders, then those who are 
threatened may be justified in requiring (by use of force, if necessary) that 
the group changes its way of living. 9 But once we acknowledge the importance 
to individuals of maintaining their common life, then intervention, except 
for the purpose of self-defence, will almost always be ruled out--for reasons 
both practical and moral. 10 
Whether our morality is based on a respect for persons and their right 
to determine their own ends and ways of living, or on a concern for their 
feelings and preferences, the violation of a common life cannot usually be 
justified. Practically speaking, attempts to force people to change their way 
of life will usually fail to have the desired effect. The people concerned 
are bound to resist. They will learn the new ways that are forced upon 
them reluctantly, resentfully, and probably imperfectly. They will tenaciously 
cling to their old values. The failure of the efforts to assimilate Aborigines 
into the way of life of European settlers suggests that attempts o force 
people to give up their traditional way of l ife--however well intentioned 
s Ibid., p. 57. 
9 Thus the Allies were probably right to require the Germans and the Japanese to change 
those aspects of their way of fife which seemed to be responsible for their aggression. 
However, it would have been illegitimate o require that they give up their common life 
altogether o  surrender their sovereignty in perpetuity. 
~0 As I argue below, intervention may also be justified to protect minority groups from oppression. 
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320 I. Land Rights and Aboriginal Sovereignty 
they may be--are likely to do more harm to them than good. 
Respect for a people's common life does not logically require that they 
ought to be allowed to exercise sovereignty. It has been possible for people 
to maintain a common life without having control over territory and the 
ability to make the laws of the land (as have the Jews of the diaspora). 
But there are good empirical reasons for thinking that having the rights 
of sovereignty is the best means, in the world as it is, of protecting a common 
life and being able to pass it on to descendants. Groups which are forced 
to live under a law which is not of their making run the risk of persecution 
or assimilation (as have the Jews of the diaspora). 
Given that exercising sovereignty is in general the most reliable way for 
people to protect heir common life, it is understandable why the entitlements 
which are usually associated with sovereignty are thought o be so important 
and so inviolable. To invade other people's territory is not only to threaten 
their lives and their property but also to threaten their common life. To 
require people to accept large numbers of new settlers in their territory 
can also be a serious threat o their common life. In the case of the Aborigines 
the loss of sovereignty and the loss of their ability to maintain their common 
life are clearly connected. The colonial occupation of lands like Australia 
did interfere drastically with the ability of native people to live as they 
chose. So if an attempt o justify colonialism is to succeed it must give 
reasons for believing that this kind of interference is justified. 
Can Colonialism be Justified? 
Philosophers and others have sometimes argued that establishing European 
settlements in territories like Australia is no violation of the rights of the 
native inhabitants, because these people have more than enough land for 
their own uses, and can legitimately be asked (or forced, if necessary) to 
settle more closely or to allow Europeans to take charge of what they do 
not need. Locke and many others have argued in this way. I~ 
But the argument is open to an obvious objection: whether land is going 
to waste or not depends on the nature of the labour of the people and 
not simply on the capacity of the land. Hunting and gathering people require 
more territory to carry on their way of life than do people in an agricultural 
society, and an agricultural society cannot support the same number of people 
as an urbanised industrial society. The territories which Europeans thought 
were virtually empty were in fact generally carrying as large a population 
of native people as they could carry. Forcing such people to settle more 
closely meant either reducing their numbers or destroying their way of life 
(or both). 
~ 'There are still great tracts of land to be found, which the inhabitants thereof, not having 
joined with the rest of mankind in the consent of the use of their common money, lie 
waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it, or can make use of, and so still 
lie in common.' (Second Treatise on Government, Para. 45) Since it lies in common, others 
can rightly appropriate it. 
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Janna Thompson 321 
Perhaps it can be argued, however, that Aborigines and other native people 
were not entitled to the use and control of the land that hey occupied 
because they were not using it as well or as intensively as it could be used. 
Many of those who have argued for colonialism argue on those grounds. 
Henry Sidgwick in Elements of Politics insists that no community has exclusive 
right to the enjoyment of its resources. Though the entitlements associated 
with sovereignty, he agrees, ought generally to be respected among civilised 
people, uncivilised people have no moral right to the territory they inhabit, 
though they ought to be compensated for the loss of their lands if possible. 
'It does not indeed seem to me that a moral right of savages to their hunting- 
grounds can be allowed in the interest of the human race, to verride the 
claim of civilised races to expand. '~2 The argument could be construed as 
a utilitarian one: the European settlers because of their superior social 
organisation and technology could use the land much more productively 
than the Aborigines and for the benefit of many more people. By being 
able to settle in Australia, European settlers would make themselves better 
off than they could have b en if they had stayed in the old country; they 
would also benefit people in other countries by growing wool, mining gold 
and so forth. Eventually their labour would even benefit the Aborigines 
who would become assimilated to European culture and would be much 
better off than they were before.~ 3 
Many of the assumptions on which this argument isbased can be questioned. 
It is not clear that those settlers who came as convict labourers or those 
who settled and went broke on the drought-ridden plains of Australia were 
better off than they would have been if they had stayed home. It can be 
doubted whether these settlers contributed anything essential to the world. 
It can be argued that the higher productivity which European farmers 
managed to achieve on Australian soil has so severely damaged native 
ecological systems that the land is in danger of being ruined forever. Most 
of all, it is doubtful whether Aborigines now or in the past are better off 
as the result of the European invasion. But let us skirt around these minor 
objections and get to the main point: can a violation of sovereignty be justified 
on the utilitarian grounds which Sidgwick offers? 
Utilitarian arguments have the nasty habit of turning in the hands of those 
who use them and delivering consequences which they do not welcome. 
The British pacifist and philosopher, C.E.M. Joad, who in the days before 
the outbreak of World War II was casting desperately about for a way 
of preventing the conflict, hit on the idea that Britain should give part of 
Australia to Japan. The reasons he gives are comparable to the reasons 
Sidgwick and others have used to justify colonialism: Japan is an 
overpopulated and dynamic country; and its people need room to expand. 
12 Henry Sidgwick, Elements oJ Politics, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1897), p. 256. 
t3 Native people, Sidgwick assumes, will eventually be assimilated into European society, will 
be 'educated tothe habits of steady labour' and will benefit accordingly. 
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322 L Land Rights and Aboriginal Sovereignty 
Australia is underpopulated and its people can be made to settle more 
closely. 14 
Ignoring the British arrogance inherent in this suggestion--the assumption 
that Britain can dispose of Australia as it pleases--the argument from a 
utilitarian point of view ought o be taken seriously. We could add that 
since the Japanese are highly industrious and productive, accustomed to 
using to the maximum all available materials, that they would be able to 
use Australian resources more productively than the native inhabitants, thus 
benefitting themselves and the whole world. Australians would also eventually 
benefit from their activity, especially if they became assimilated into Japanese 
society. If giving some or all of Australia to the Japanese can also prevent 
major world conflict, then surely our utilitarian calculation of the benefits 
of this policy must go up by at least several notches. 
Is it merely chauvinism which makes us want to reject Joad's suggestion? 
If we do want to reject it then there are two ways to do so: We could 
insist that utilitarianism gives us the wrong answer in cases like this; that 
central to our morality ought to be a respect for peoples, as well as a respect 
for persons. This means that sovereignty should not be violated against he 
will of a people for the sake of the general good. Or alternatively, we might 
argue that the desire of individuals to maintain their common life ought 
to weigh much more heavily than utilitarians like Sidgwick have weighed 
it. Whichever way we choose, colonialism remains unjustified. 
But surely Sidgwick is right to insist that people do not have exclusive 
right to the enjoyment of their resources or the right to dispose of them 
as they please. I think there are at least two types of cases where we would 
be inclined to say that people should be required to share their resources 
with others, or should be prohibited from using their resources in a particular 
way. 
People who are well supplied with resources have a moral obligation 
to help impoverished or desperate people in other countries. This means 
that if individuals or a group of people within a country are no longer able 
to live a decent life where they are, either because they are being persecuted 
by their government or because their land will no longer support them, 
then wealthy countries are obligated to take them in, if this is the most 
feasible way of helping them. On the other hand, it is illegitimate for a 
government to try to solve its social problems by forcing people to emigrate 
(as did the British when they set up convict settlements in Australia). Nor 
is it legitimate for people to demand entry to another country simply because 
they no longer want to live where they are or because there seem to be 
more opportunities lsewhere. 
People should be prohibited from using their resources as they please 
if in doing so they would be drastically interfering with the lives, health 
14 C.E.M. Joad, Guide to Modem Wickedness (London: Faber and Faber, 1938): 'To concede 
to Japan a large slice of Australian territory that the British are unable to populate would 
satisfy at once the demands of justice and the dictates of expediency', p. 179. 
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Janna Thompson 323 
or common life of the people in another country. If, for example, their 
industrial processes are causing serious pollution problems in other countries, 
then they should do something to prevent the harm they are doing. The 
interdependence of the people of the world, the fact that the activities of 
people in one country are increasingly likely to affect the well being of 
people in another, may eventually force us to modify some of our ideas 
about the rights associated with sovereignty--with consequences for 
international law, our customary practices and even Just War Theory. ~5 
So our conception of what sovereignty entails is not unchallengeable and 
may come under increasing pressure in the future. But whatever revisions 
of our ideas the future holds, colonialism, as it was practised by the British 
in Australia, remains unjustified. Australia did not contain any resources 
which the British or anyone else desperately needed, and even if it had, 
they might have been obtained through an agreement with the native people. 
Those who settled in Australia were generally not stateless people; and 
although some of them were able to make a better life here than they could 
have in their native country, few would have found it impossible to remain 
where they were. 
Utilitarian arguments do not provide a way of justifying colonial practice. 
But other, non-utilitarian considerations have sometimes been brought in 
in order to make the case. Colonialists have often believed that they are 
justified in doing what they are doing because they are members of a superior 
race and representatives of an advanced culture; whereas Aborigines, in 
their opinion, are an inferior ace with a primitive culture. Like animals, 
native people have been thought o be beings with fewer rights who can 
be legitimately supplanted. Sidgwick's reference to the superior entitlements 
of civilised people suggests this line of reasoning. The argument doesn't 
carry much weight today among thoughtful people, mainly because it has 
been established that it is based on bad biology and bad anthropology. 
Theories claiming the superiority of particular aces have long since been 
shown to be false. The idea that Aboriginal culture is more primitive, that 
its language, its laws, its institutions and religion are more child-like or 
immature than the language and culture of Europeans, has been discarded 
by anthropologists and linguists. But once we have rejected 19th Century 
views about racial and cultural superiority it becomes difficult to make sense 
of the view that one culture or people are superior to another. In what 
respect? And once we start trying to select criteria, it becomes clear that 
objective comparisons are not easy to make. To the extent hat they are 
possible it is by no means a foregone conclusion that European culture 
will turn out to be in every, or any, respect superior. 
15 Charles Beitz in Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1979) argues more radically that the resources of our interdependent world ought 
to be distributed according to the principles of Rawls' theory of justice. This means he 
argues that a defensive war may not always be justified: ' . . .  a war of self defence fought 
by an affluent nation against apoorer nation pressing legitimate claims under global principles 
(for example, for increased food aid) might be unjustifiable...' (176) 
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324 I. Land Rights and Aboriginal Sovereignty 
However, the question of whose culture and way of life is superior is 
beside the point. If people are entitled to sovereignty because of the importance 
to them of maintaining their common life, then surely this entitlement is
not affected by what we think of their culture, anymore than an individual's 
entitlement to privacy is affected by our judgments about what she does 
with it. 
This conclusion, it will be argued, must be modified. Some things that 
people do to themselves or each other in their societies or in their private 
lives are immoral, harmful and ought to be stopped. There are (or have 
been) practices carried on by people in some places which most of us would 
agree are morally reprehensible: footbinding of women, the practice of suttee, 
cannibalism, human sacrifice, exposure of infants, or in the case of Aboriginal 
society, ritual spearing or forcing girls to marry tribal elders. 16 If these 
practices are evil, then surely it is the duty of others to stop them. Many 
people regard it as a good thing that the British largely stamped out the 
practice of suttee in India and footbinding in China. 
If the eradication of injustice or evil is to serve as a justification of 
colonialism then we must argue like Walzer that what people in a society 
do to each other can be grounds for a violation of their sovereignty. However, 
there are significant differences between the cases which Walzer has in 
mind and the vils that colonial governments are trying to prevent. Walzer 
is clearly thinking about those cases where a group, persecuted by their 
government or byothers in the society, desperately wants help and welcomes 
outside intervention. But the practices of native people are generally accepted 
by all, including the victims of them, who share the same cultural values; 
and even where there is opposition to these practices within the society, 
those who object would not necessarily welcome outside intervention. Most 
people would prefer to deal with what they object to in their society in 
their own way. 
In any case, there is a question of what kind of violation of sovereignty 
is justified in order to prevent evil. Just War Theory allows that force can 
be used to remedy injustice, whether committed against outsiders or against 
people living within a society, but it also insists that once the injustice is 
remedied the intervention must cease. Remedying injustice or preventing 
evil does not seem to be a good reason for taking over the sovereignty 
of a territory in perpetuity, settling people on land that belonged to others 
or trying to force native people to adopt a radically different way of life. 
What Interventions are Justified? 
Neither utilitarian considerations or a duty to prevent evil can justify the 
t6 These are the practices which are often mentioned by those critical of Aboriginal society. 
See for example Hugh Morgan, 'Religious Traditions, Mining and Land Rights' (Speech, 
May 1984) printed in Ken Baker, ed., The Land Rights Debate (op. cit.). Some people will 
argue that these practices, and other native practices listed, are not evil in the context 
of the society (or not seriously evil). I am assuming for the sake of argument that some 
of them are. 
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Janna Thompson 325 
dispossession of Aborigines from the sovereignty they exercised over the 
land on which they lived. Unless some other justification can somehow be 
found for colonialism, we must conclude that what Britain did in 1788 was 
morally indefensible. ~7 But having reached this conclusion my argument 
provokes two difficult questions. The first is the question of what interventions, 
if any, the people of one society are justified in making into the lives of 
those in another society. If the British, and other European powers, had 
been prepared to act morally in relation to the Aborigine people, then what 
should they have done? The second question is more directly relevant to 
our present position: what can Aborigines living today rightly claim in 
reparation for the violation of their ancestors' sovereignty? I will not be 
able to answer these questions fully but the following discussion brings out 
some of the issues which have to be considered. 
Does a respect for the sovereignty exercised by a people rule out any 
intervention i  their lives whatsoever? Captain Cook said of the Aborigines 
he encountered: 'They didn't wany anything we gave them. All they wanted 
was that we should be gone.' Let us suppose that the relevant European 
powers at the time were willing to take the wishes of the Aborigines eriously. 
Australia would henceforth be declared out of bounds to settlers, traders, 
adventurers, mineral prospectors. A few anthropologists might be let in from 
time to time to keep informed about the wishes of the natives. In other 
words, Aborigines would be protected and isolated from outside interference 
in the way that animal communities are sometimes protected in wilderness 
reserves. 
The analogy provokes what I think is a strong objection to this policy 
of total non-intervention: that this is no way of treating other human beings. 
To treat people as human, it has been argued, is to treat them as individuals 
with whom we can communicate: xchange ideas, make agreements, engage 
in mutual criticism, tell stories, etc. It would thus not be treating people 
as human beings to isolate them in such a way as to make this kind of 
exchange impossible, and Aborigines as rational beings should be able to 
recognise that it is not in their interest to be left strictly alone. 
It follows that the policy of total non-intervention is ot justified. I have, 
however, two important doubts about this conclusion. The first comes from 
the recognition that intervention not only spreads ideas, it also spreads disease. 
It could be argued that the worst blow to Aborigines and their culture was 
not their contact with European settlers but their contact with European 
diseases. I do not know how to weigh this serious disadvantage associated 
with contact between peoples against he advantages of contact. Secondly, 
the notion that universal communication a d critical discussion among groups 
are valuable presupposes that people are similar enough in their interests 
and their views of what is good and fight so that the ideas of each are 
~7 A distinction has to be made between what the British collectively did and the responsibility 
of British officers or settlers as individuals for British policies and the harm done to Aborigines. 
Here I am talking about the responsibility of the British collectively. Why and to what 
extent individuals hould regard themselves as responsible for repairing the harm done 
by a collective is something I discuss briefly below. 
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326 I. Land Rights and Aboriginal Sovereignty 
intelligible to and applicable by all. But this may not be true. For example, 
people whose identities as individuals are inseparable from their position 
in a kinship group, a clan or a tribe may not find Western ideas about 
individual rights or the equality of individuals intelligible, much less plausible. 
If this is so, why should we suppose that anything ood is being accomplished 
by insisting on exposing them to these ideas? 
However, if it is accepted that otal non-intervention is wrong or impractical, 
it remains to be considered what kind of intervention could be justified. 
The discussion suggests that being able to make a legitimate intervention 
will depend upon finding a satisfactory trade-off between doing what is 
beneficial to Aborigines as human beings, and not doing what will seriously 
disrupt he common life that they value. 18 
I want to suggest that a respect for the sovereignty ofother people requires 
that what is beneficial and what is harmful to them be decided by the people 
concerned. This is certainly what we would want in our own case. This 
means that we can't force people to learn about the benefits of Christianity, 
critical rationality, private enterprise or socialism. What we can do is to 
try to persuade them that our ideas, values and ways of doing things are 
of interest o them and provide them with opportunities for learning about 
them. Similarly, they should be able to do the same for us. If this formula 
for peaceful intervention is taken seriously, then it must be admitted that 
a satisfactory adaptation of cultures to each other would probably take 
generations of contact. 
We can conclude, then (while taking note of the reservations stated) that 
it would have been legitimate for the British to establish contact with 
Aboriginal groups, to try to make mutually beneficial agreements with them, 
to give them the opportunity of learning whatever, they wanted from us 
and us the opportunity to learn from them. This kind of contact would 
undoubtedly have required the British to set up bases of operation on 
Aboriginal and and I think it could be argued that they would have been 
justified in doing this whether the Aborigines liked it or not. But there is 
a long distance between this kind of contact and colonialism as it was practised 
in Australia and elsewhere. 
It has to be acknowledged that this whole discussion about what was 
justified in 1788 and what was not will strike some people as being somewhat 
ludicrous in view of what the British did do--and what we feel that they, 
or someone lse, were bound to do. The arguments which I have offered 
against colonial invasion (like the arguments de Victoria put forward over 
four hundred years ago) rest on values and principles which are the products 
of Western civilisation. But colonialism, too, is a product of Western 
)8 Franciscus de Victoria rgued (De lnd/s, op.cit., Sec. II, xxxi) that it was not lawful for 
Spaniards to force the Indians of the New World to accept Christianity. But he insisted 
that the Spanish were entitled to preach the gospel to the Indians and could defend this 
entitlement by force. The Spanish were not entitled to take over Indian land, but they 
were entitled to trade with Indians and to use resources which the Indians did not use 
and could defend this right (Sec. III, xxxviii). 
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civilisation, and colonisers have never been swayed by the moral principles 
on which our society is supposed to rest. In the case of colonialism, the 
gap between the dictates of morality and customary practice has been 
spectacularly wide. To determine why this has been so requires another 
kind of enquiry. 
Aboriginal Land Rights 
Given that the British did what they did, what can Aborigines now demand 
in reparation for the violation of the sovereignty of their ancestors? 19The 
problems which arise in answering this question are similar to those which 
arise in other cases where injustice has been committed by past generations. 
On what basis can Aborigines make a claim for reparations? On the basis 
that they are the heirs of those who were in rightful possession of the land? 
But we non-Aborigines can also make a claim to be the rightful possessors 
on the grounds that we have assumed our control in a legitimate way, either 
by being born here or by being accepted as immigrants. How can presently 
existing Aborigines claim reparations when they were not the ones who 
were dispossessed? And how can they claim reparations from us when we 
are not he ones responsible for the injustice. (Most of us are not even the 
descendants of the British officials and settlers who arrived in 1788.) How 
can events that happened two hundred years ago have any bearing on the 
responsibilities and entitlements ofpeople today? 
There are, I think, two ways in which the past does affect our responsibilities. 
The past is relevant to our present moral responsibilities, first of all, because 
events of the past have causally brought about present relationships between 
people. The disadvantages which the Aborigines now suffer are to a large 
extent he result of past injuries done to Aborigines--not simply the result 
of the brutal way in which Aborigines have often been treated by white 
settlers, but also of the violation of Aboriginal sovereignty by the British. 
Aborigines can rightly demand reparation for injuries they themselves are 
still suffering as the result of this violation. They can demand reparation 
from us  because we have a general duty to aid the disadvantaged, and more 
particularly because we have a responsibility for the institutions and attitudes 
of our society which are still causing harm to Aborigines. 
The past is also relevant o our responsibilities in the present because 
the attitudes of people to the past make it relevant. To belong to a people, 
to be part of a common life, is not simply to relate to presently existing 
people in a particular way but to have an attachment to past and future 
generations, to regard oneself as carrying on the traditions and values of 
the past, keeping faith with those who have gone before, and transmitting 
~9 I have chosen to use the term 'reparation' rather than the more familiar 'compensation' 
because reparations are what are paid for violations of sovereignty, and because 
'compensation' (probably more than 'reparation') carries with it the suggestion that people 
ought to be brought back to the condition they were in before the harm was done--which 
in this case is inappropriate and impractical. 
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328 I. Land Rights and Aboriginal Sovereignty 
these traditions and values to one's children. Given that maintaining a common 
life is important o individuals, then they ought to be able to pass it on 
to their children, providing that there is no good reason (of the sort already 
discussed) for preve.nting them from doing so. Because of their ancestors' 
loss of sovereignty, Aborigines of today, those to whom their culture and 
tradition are still important, suffer a spiritual as well as material deprivation 
as the result of past events. They cannot keep faith with their ancestors 
and adequately pass on what they believe is important o their children; 
and we have discovered no good reason why they should be prevented from 
doing this. Aborigines would probably still suffer from this kind of deprivation 
even if they were to receive good housing, better education, employment, 
equal opportunities. Of course this spiritual deprivation would cease to exist 
if Aborigines became completely assimilated into white society. But the 
assimilation policies of the past have proved ineffective both because of 
the racism of white people and because many Aborigines have wanted to 
cling to their own cultural identity. The fact that many have done so in 
spite of all the attempts made to discourage them is a demonstration of
how important i is to individuals to maintain their common life. 
People who suffer from spiritual deprivation because of their relation to 
the past can rightly claim what is required for this deprivation to be overcome. 
What this means exactly will depend on their circumstances, their needs 
and desires, and the needs and desires of others who also have an entitlement 
to be where they are. Many Aborigines have suffered and still suffer from 
the consequences of being subject o laws, and forced to adapt to ways 
of life, which they find alien. In this respect heir situation seems different 
from that of Italian, Chinese, Lebanese and other settlers who have sometimes 
suffered from prejudice and persecution in Australia. These settlers can 
probably manage to maintain what they want of their way of life within 
the legal, political and social framework of Australian society; in any case, 
they have chosen to immigrate. Aborigines have had a much more difficult 
time maintaining their common life in Australian society, and they have 
not chosen their fate. 
Therefore, the granting to Aboriginal communities of rights over land 
seems to be the most appropriate way of offering reparation for the harm 
done, both because this is what these communities desire, and because the 
use and control of land gives people an opportunity to live as they want 
to live. But if having land is going to allow Aborigines to overcome their 
spiritual deprivation and maintain the life they want, then 'land rights' must 
mean more than merely owing land. The demand for Aboriginal sovereignty 
which has become common in some Aboriginal communities i an attempt 
to formulate a conception of land rights adequate to the needs which many 
Aborigines have. 
As long as Aborigines remain citizens of Australia then they cannot exercise 
'sovereignty' in the usual sense of that term; they will not be autonomous. 
Nevertheless, their control over land could be such that they have some 
of the entitlements customarily associated with sovereignty: the entitlement 
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to live by their own law, as far as their internal affairs are concerned, to 
control the resources of their land and determine who can enter and settle 
on it; the fight to retain their land in perpetuity, so that they can be assured 
of handing down their entitlements to their descendants. What exactly these 
entitlements should entail is something that would have to be negotiated 
between Aboriginal communities and the Australian Government as the 
representative of the Australian people. 
Aborigines are entitled to claim land rights from us because an appreciation 
of the importance to individuals of their common life ought to be central 
to our moral concerns. But we have another, more particular, reason for 
being concerned with this matter. We, too, like to think of ourselves as 
a people and not simply as a collection of individuals whose ancestors were 
dumped here, or who gravitated here for one reason or another. Part of 
what it means for individuals to become a people is for them to take 
responsibility for what their institutions do and for what the people of their 
society have done in the past. If individuals who call themselves Australian 
are not willing to do this then there is no such thing as the Australian ation 
and the attempt to celebrate its foundation isnot only an affront o Aborigines 
but an exercise in absurdity. 
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